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Chronic breathlessness: re-thinking the
symptom
To the Editor:
Is chronic breathlessness a symptom or a syndrome? Although hotly debated [1–5], we would like to
suggest an alternative viewpoint. Here, we speculate that the argument over chronic breathlessness being
considered as either a symptom or syndrome both holds us within a reductionist framework, and
somewhat misses the point.
The approach of traditional medicine has been to identify and target the pathophysiology thought to
underlie symptoms, and thus treat a disease. However, more modern neuroscientific approaches have
taken a significant leap forward within our understanding of perceptual systems. First examined within
the conventional, exteroceptive senses (vision, touch, etc.), the “Bayesian brain hypothesis” outlines
how perception occurs as a result of a delicate balance between incoming sensory information and the
brain’s predictions about the world around us, based on learned experiences (priors) (figure 1). This
hypothesis has recently been applied with vigour toward a more abstract set of perceptions,
which consider the monitoring of our internal sensations (termed interoception [6–8]), such as
breathing [9, 10].
Thus, this framework emboldens us for a more comprehensive appreciation of the important point raised
by CALVERLEY [5]; namely, understanding what illness means to the patient and how it affects their lives.
Each individual brings their own set of prior expectations, interoceptive abilities and bodily awareness [11,
12] and, thus, breathlessness will be both vastly quantitatively and qualitatively different between
individuals. The breadth of these differences cannot hope to be enumerated into a narrow, homogenous
set of symptoms that fall within a customary definition of a “syndrome”, but that does not need to be
what JOHNSON et al. [1] were trying to achieve. The point, instead, is to view breathlessness as something
that might not directly correspond to airway pathophysiology, and which may need to be treated both in
parallel and independently of the lungs.
Furthermore, this theoretical view of breathlessness does not simply stop at lung disease. Whilst descriptive
differences are often apparent between individuals who experience breathlessness in health, lung disease
and other breathlessness-associated diseases, there is unlikely to be a hard qualitative boundary that exists
between these (sometimes transient) health statuses. The wealth of experiences and prior expectations
brought to the table by even healthy individuals will evoke a spectrum of breathlessness perceptions, and
may even alter an individual’s propensity towards symptom severity and debilitation, should they ever
become associated with disease. Therefore, attempts to quantify even the intensity of breathlessness as a
more purely physiological perception determined by neural respiratory drive, whilst appealing within a
traditional reductionist framework, appears to be a significant oversimplification that moves us further
from understanding breathlessness within an individual.
So where do we go from here? How do we tackle these seemingly infinite degrees of freedom and
dimensions of breathlessness within an individual? Whilst phrenology was popular within the Victorian
era, where different parts of the brain were assigned different functions, we must now update our
methodology to equip us to test these current theories. Modern neuroimaging techniques allow us to
envision cortical activity that may flow from areas such as primary motor/sensory cortices and posterior
insula, relevant for primary signal transduction of afferent inputs, but we must tread carefully in labelling
this “conscious perception”. Instead, perception (and indeed breathlessness) is likely to be an evolving
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function embedded within dynamic brain networks, where transduced sensory inputs are continuously
compared to the brain’s model of the world. Thus, linear increases in activity within one brain area is not
likely to produce a corresponding linear change in breathlessness, and we need to equip ourselves with
appropriate computational strategies [13, 14] to tackle these more difficult, more multi-dimensional brain
network models.
Therefore, the suggestion from CAMPBELL and HOWELL [15] that “a respiratory physiologist offering a
unitary explanation for breathlessness should arouse the same suspicions as a tattooed archbishop
offering a free ticket to heaven”, appears to have been a foreseen and apt word of caution to our
modern neuroscientific selves. Indeed, to understand breathlessness we need to delve into the brain
more deeply, requiring an understanding of the networks that generate perception, and not just
correlated activity in single brain areas. In turn, this may lead us to identify important treatable
traits relating to breathlessness, complementing periphery-based therapies across a host of
diseases and disorders, and hopefully better address the holistic effect of an illness on the life of an
individual.
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FIGURE 1 Schematic of the Bayesian brain hypothesis. Both prior expectations and incoming sensory
information contribute to the resulting perception, where each is a distribution of possible values. Thus, both
the precision and position of priors and sensory inputs can influence perception.
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From the authors:
We agree with much presented in O.K. Faull and colleagues’ response to our proposed chronic
breathlessness syndrome and thank them for their views supporting chronic breathlessness as more than
just a symptom [1]. In particular, we agree that naming and defining chronic breathlessness as a syndrome
does not aim, or need, to constrain a recognition or understanding of quantitative and qualitative
between-individual differences. We agree that our intention is to ensure patients and their families living
with the daily disability affecting all domains of life, irrespective of cause, may legitimately bring this
experience to the attention of health and social professionals, receive a systematic assessment and
subsequently benefit from individually tailored evidence-based management.
There are two issues for comment. Firstly, O.K. Faull and colleagues appear to equate breathlessness with
primarily a sensory, effective and cognitive perception. However, the foremost burden of chronic
breathlessness is not sensory, but rather the functional confinement that breathlessness imposes on an
individual. In chronic breathlessness, affective and cognitive perceptions relate more to loss of function,
socialisation and fulfilment, and to fear of suffocation and death. Chronic breathlessness syndrome
highlights that the impact of this condition reaches well beyond the unpleasant perceptions of, and
emotional response to, a symptom into the realm of functional impairment and disability. This concept is
illustrated well in recently published practical clinical assessment and management approaches to chronic
breathlessness, the Breathing, Thinking, Functioning and Breathing SPACE models [2, 3].
Secondly, the use of the term reductionist is unhelpful as implied by O.K. Faull and colleagues, that is, a
syndrome attempts the impossible; a complex idea cannot be completely understood in terms of its
components and an attempt to do so is foolish. However, reductionist may also be used in the sense of
analysing “complex things into less complex constituents” [4]. “Breathlessness persists despite optimal
treatment and causes disability” [1] for many, yet remains almost totally invisible to most health and
social care professionals. Therefore chronic breathlessness needs an identifiable profile in order to bring
patient experience into view, help them access evidence-based interventions and stimulate research into the
complexity of breathlessness in order to identify future therapeutic targets. Already, the work of O.K. Faull
and colleagues has increased our understanding that perception of chronic breathlessness (experienced by
patients) compared with that in healthy volunteer models is different; but much more research is needed
[5]. If reducing the complex to recognisable components in clinical practice helps clinicians to routinely
assess patients, helps patients have their concerns heard, helps carers to seek support and understanding,
and helps services to develop and research to grow, then the reduction of chronic breathlessness to a
syndrome will have made a major difference to the lives of many.
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To the Editor:
We wholly applaud the move by JOHNSON et al. [1] to improve awareness of breathlessness and to raise its
profile as a subject for focussed clinical research. We consider their research and the ensuing proposal to
recognise breathlessness via a new medical term, “chronic breathlessness syndrome”, as important and
justified. We share their goal, which is to direct attention to this neglected, undertreated and
under-researched symptom.
There are two important caveats to be made in response to this article, however. First, there is a need to
involve those who live with chronic breathlessness and are thus “experts by experience” in discussions
about the framework proposed here, rather than bringing them into the conversation once consensus has
been achieved. Second, further medicalisation of breathlessness via the term “syndrome” may not be the
best way forward. Research into patients’ experience of breathlessness shows that the ways in which
breathlessness is spoken about (medicalised and otherwise) not only reflect their experiences but also helps
to shape how breathlessness is lived [2–6].
O.K. Faull and colleagues, in their response to JOHNSON et al. [1], comment on the individuality of
responses to breathlessness that rely on prior experiences and bodily awareness (interoception). Context
and culture play an important role in shaping the understanding and perception of breathlessness [2–4, 6].
For example, among African American communities across the USA, the last words of Eric Garner, “I
can’t breathe”, as he suffocated in a tussle with police officers, have become a slogan for the Black Lives
Matter movement and a metaphor for the lives of those living under other kinds of oppression [2].
BAŞOĞLU [7] suggests that asphyxiation is the most traumatic form of torture and that persistent
breathlessness because of an underlying medical condition may be even worse due to the duration of the
suffering involved.
Sufferers of respiratory illness vary in relation to the intensity, affect, ideation and meaning they attribute
to their breathlessness [3–6]. It affects every aspect of the life of a breathless person in ways that
description of it as a medical symptom cannot capture in full [8]. There is a need to legitimise a range of
attitudes towards breathlessness in order for them to inform the clinical encounter. Collecting such
experiences under the umbrella term “syndrome” may not be sufficient to enable full expression of the
variability and multiple meanings of the experience of breathlessness, and may carry unexpected cognitive
and affective “baggage” that detracts from its utility as a proxy for experience.
In view of the highly contextualised experience of breathlessness, it is critical to think about whose views
are part of the debate. Discussions with experts by experience and first-person reports of experiences of
breathlessness [3, 5] have revealed how powerful language and context are in determining how people with
breathlessness think about and experience their problem [4, 6], and how this influences what they might
do. Words such as “pulmonary” and “rehabilitation”, for example, may negatively impact upon the uptake
of one of the most effective interventions for breathlessness [6].
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There is a further stage necessary in the research process of JOHNSON et al. [1] in order to validate the
claim made in the paper that “a recognised syndrome would […] give permission for patients to discuss
their ongoing breathlessness with their clinicians”. As JOHNSON et al. [1] suggest, patients and their families
need to be involved in the discussion, but they should be able to critique the framework suggested by the
paper, rather than be presented with it as a fait accompli. Otherwise there is a danger that the words
“chronic” and “syndrome” will drive people with breathlessness further underground, in part because they
have not been involved in the process of describing their own condition [9]. We encourage JOHNSON et al.
[1] to take this research on to its next logical stage, that of developing a truly consensual terminology that
considers the critical role language, metaphor and meaning play in both living with and treating
breathlessness. This could be done using the Delphi technique within a more participatory paradigm [10].
Such an approach offers the chance of empowering patients and caregivers in ways that would result in
real changes to both their experience and treatment.
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